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LIBSON SHOPS AND THE 1954 CODE
by
Thomas N. Tarleau* and Robert B. Hodes**
T HE survival of a corporate net operating loss deduction is a
problem which has vexed the courts, the Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service and taxpayers ever since the loss carryover provi-
sions were first enacted.' The problem arises where, because of changes
in ownership, business, capital structure or form, the corporation
after suffering the loss has been modified before utilizing it. As a
policy matter, the carryover allowance responds to the need for tax
relief in two situations. First, it assists new enterprises by permitting
losses which are often incurred in start-up periods to reduce taxes
which would otherwise be borne by later profits.' Secondly, by aver-
aging profit and loss years over an effective nine-year period, the
corporate tax applies to the actual net income of that period despite
fluctuations between profit and loss years.3 However, these situations
hardly comprehend the dynamism and variety of the economy. The
economy and legal system of the country accommodate complexity,
flexibility and innovation in the structure and ownership of business
organizations to a degree which often frustrates attempts to legislate
in terms of familiar, simple or static subjects. Companies are con-
stantly bought and sold, recapitalized and reorganized; the business
may be abandoned, or augmented; new activities, fresh capital, or
new people may be added as required. Indeed, net operating losses
often evidence the need for change. Furthermore, an available loss
carryover deduction, worth about fifty cents on the dollar against fu-
ture profits, is necessarily an element considered in whether and how
* LL.B., Columbia University; Tax Legislative Counsel of the United States Treasury
Department, 1938-1942.
" A.B., Dartmouth College; LL.B., Harvard University.
'The carryover and carryback of net losses was introduced into the tax structure by the
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1061. See note 14 infra for the changes
which have occurred in the periods over which these deductions may be spread.
When a loss business is modified, it is only the carryover provisions which are relevant
prospectively to the new owners. Under § 172(b) of the 1954 Code, the carryback provi-
sions must be utilized before the carryover provisions are utilized. Therefore, if a carryback
does exist, the refund available will be regarded as equivalent to cash in any negotiations
concerning the modification.
a For example, assuming no adjustments are necessary, if a business loses $100,000 during
its first year of operation and then in each of the succeeding five years it earns $20,000, at
the end of this six year period it will not have had to pay any tax.
a For example, assuming no adjustments are necessary, in each of the first three years a
corporation earned $10,000, in the fourth it lost $80,000, and in each of the next succeeding
five years it earns $10,000, that corporation would not have any tax liability. In the fourth
year, a refund claim would retrieve the tax paid in the first three years, and the carryover
of $50,000 would be utilized to eliminate the tax for each of the succeeding five years.
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change is to occur. These realities result in the tendency to oppose lib-
eralization of the carryover provisions. Congress has been concerned
about the so-called "traffic" in loss deductions-the notion that tax
relief which is the product of legislative grace may somehow come to
be bought and sold between private persons bent on profit.4 The for-
mal evolution of which corporations are capable (which, under the
tax laws, is sometimes encouraged) often extends the circumstances
under which loss deductions are used very far beyond the elemen-
tary cases which Congress had in mind when the loss carryover pro-
visions were enacted. The question has been: "How far is too far?"
both from the point of view of policy and the interpretation of
existing statutes. At one extreme is the struggling new business, rely-
ing on the carryover deduction to secure its hoped for foothold in
profitability; at the other is the corporate shell having no value other
than the carryover which is bought solely for the purpose of afford-
ing new owners the benefit of tax shelter.! Between these extremes
fall an almost infinite number of possibilities. It has not been easy
to devise formulas which are capable of discriminating between ob-
scure shades of difference.
The 1939 Code contained two principal provisions covering cor-
porate loss carryovers: Section 122, the underlying provision, cre-
ated the deduction and allowed it to "the taxpayer" which had in-
curred a net operating loss;' section 129 denied the use of the carry-
over where the control of the business had been transferred for the
"principal purpose" of obtaining the tax benefit.7 The operation of
4 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
'See Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the
Internal Revenue Code, $8 HARv. L. REV. 196 (1944), with examples of advertisements
from the Wall Street Journal and New York Times for the buying or selling of corporations
whose only asset is a loss carryover.
0Section 122(b) of the 1939 Code reads in part:
If for any taxable year . .. the taxpayer has a net operating loss, such net
operating loss shall be a net operating loss carry-back for each of the two
preceding taxable years ....
If for any taxable year . . . the taxpayer has a net operating loss, such net
operating loss shall be a net operating loss carry-over for each of the two suc-
ceeding taxable years ...
7 Section 129(a) of the 1939 Code reads in part:
If (1) any person or persons acquire . . . directly or indirectly, control of
a corporation, or (2) any corporation acquires . . . directly or indirectly,
property of another corporation, not controlled, directly or indirectly, immedi-
ately prior to such acquisition, by such acquiring corporation or its stock-
holders, the basis of which property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation,
is determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor cor-
porations, and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is
evasion or avoidance of Federal income or excess profits tax by securing the
benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or cor-
poration would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit or other al-
lowance shall not be allowed.
Control was defined as ownership of 50% of the total voting stock of a corporation or
19661
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section 129 was unsatisfactory because it turned on the taxpayer's
subjective intent and, thus, never provided sufficiently predictable
results. Moreover, the Treasury believed that section 129 was too weak
because the courts too often seemed ready to hold that business pur-
poses outweighed the prohibited intent in sustaining challenged loss
carryover deductions.' The interpretation of section 129, now sec-
tion 269 of the 1954 Code, is outside the scope of this paper; how-
ever, the section does inhibit the " traffic" in "carryovers ' and some-
times disallows carryovers which escape the primarily objective re-
strictions of the cases and Code provisions discussed here.
The 1939 Code did not specifically define the extent to which a
loss carryover deduction survived a corporate reorganization, such
as a merger, consolidation, or tax-free acquisition of assets. Before
Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler" the survival of loss carryovers under
the 1939 Code seemed to depend upon two factors: The first was
business versus tax avoidance purpose under section 129. The second
was the corporate entity question. Section 122 provided: "If . . .
the taxpayer has a net operating loss, such net operating loss shall be
a net operating loss carryback [or] . ..carry-over, [for two years
.]" (Emphasis added.) Therefore, it seemed essential, if a carry-
over was to survive a corporate reorganization, that the corporation
which had incurred the loss be the survivor in the reorganization.
There were undecided issues, of course, particularly over the question
of whether it made any difference which company was the technical
survivor after a statutory merger. There was a notion that the sur-
viving company succeeded to the corporate personalities of its com-
ponent companies by operation of law. This rather metaphysical
question was much litigated because it seemed harsh that substan-
tial tax results should depend on an insubstantial evolution of a
purely fictional legal personality. However, it was generally under-
stood that a practical merger, such as a tax-free acquisition of assets
for voting stock, having the same general consequences as a statu-
ownership of 50% of the total outstanding stock of the corporation. Under § 129(b)
the Commissioner could waive the application of § 129(a) or allocate deductions if
he determined that there would be no evasion or avoidance of the Federal Income Tax.
'Despite the presumption which surrounds determinations by the Internal Revenue
Service, the Government was unsuccessful in its early attempts to defeat carryovers under
§ 129. Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); Ber-
land's Inc., 16 T. C. 182 (1951); Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T. C. 75 (1951). In Wage,
Inc., 19 T. C. 249, 256 (1952), the court explained that if the taxpayer can prove that
there was a valid purpose behind the acquisition, then he has sustained his burden of proof.
"On the basis of this record, it cannot be said that the principal purpose of the merger of
Sentinel into petitioner was to avoid or evade taxes because the facts clearly show that a
substantial business purpose was achieved. We, therefore, hold for petitioner on this
issue." Ibid.
'See note 12 infra.
10 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
[Vol. 20:258
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tory merger, sacrificed the loss carryover deduction unless the loss
corporation was the acquiring entity."
In 1954 Congress, dissatisfied with the working of the 1939 Code, 2
modified it and introduced elaborate and detailed formulas regulating
corporate utilization of carryovers where the carryover had been
transferred, or where the taxpayer concerned had undergone speci-
fied changes" in ownership and business. The 1954 changes reflect
the dual attitude which has affected most official considerations of
this subject. On one hand the principle of permitting a business to
offset the income of good years by the accumulated losses of poor
ones has been generally approved. The number of years over which
"In New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934), the assets of a loss cor-
poration were transferred to the taxpayer in exchange for stock and voting trust certificates.
These stock certificates were exchanged by the loss corporation with its shareholders for
their old stock. The taxpayer sought to utilize the old corporation's prior losses against in-
come, but this was held to be improper. The court held that the two corporations were
not identical, but were distinct; therefore, they were not the same taxpayer as required by
the statute (the Revenue Act of 1921). Under New Colonial the form of the transaction
determined tax attributes. For example, where a loss corporation was merged into another
corporation, the carryover would be lost because of the change in form. On the other hand,
had the other corporation been merged into the loss corporation, the loss carryover would
have survived.
In 1949, however, the Second Circuit in Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176
F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949), alleviated some of the harshness of the entity concept as promul-
gated by New Colonial but added another formalistic concept to this area. In Stanton
Brewery a loss subsidiary was merged into its parent holding company by way of a statutory
merger. The parent later utilized the past losses of its subsidiary and the court held that
the parent was the same taxpayer as the subsidiary that had incurred the loss. The court
distinguished New Colonial on the basis that their transfers were voluntary, whereas in
Stanton Brewery, because statutory merger procedures were utilized, the transfer was "by
operation of law."
12H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954):
Under present law where a controlling interest in a corporation is acquired
for the purpose of avoiding or evading tax liabilities the Internal Revenue
Service may disallow the benefits of a deduction, credit, or allowance which
would otherwise be enjoyed by the acquiring person or corporation. This pro-
vision has proved ineffectual, however, because of the necessity of proving that
tax avoidance was the primary purpose of the transaction. It has also been so
uncertain in its effects as to place a premium on litigation and a damper on
valid business transactions.
This special limitation on net operating loss carryover provides an objective
standard governing the availability of a major tax benefit which has been
abused through trafficking in corporations with operating loss carryovers, the
tax benefits of which are exploited by persons other than those who incurred
the loss. It treats a business which experiences a substantial change in its
ownership, to the extent of such change, as a new entity for such tax purposes.
See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954).
"Section 122 of the 1939 Code, the underlying provision allowing carrybacks and
carryforwards, was carried forward in § 172 of the 1954 Code without major sub-
stantive change. Section 129 of the 1939 Code, the then major statutory provision regulating
transactions where the "principal purpose" was tax avoidance, was carried forward in
§ 269 of the 1954 Cole with only a minor addition. Sections 381 and 382 of the 1954
Code were new and provided specifically for the use of a loss carryover after specified tax-
free reorganizations, and the regulation of such carryovers after such a reorganization if
specified changes in ownership and business accompanied the reorganization. See text ac-
companying notes 19, 26-28 infra.
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net operating loss carryovers may be deducted is now the greatest
it has ever been,14 and the utilization of the carryover after a reor-
ganization is in certain circumstances made easier." However, be-
cause Congress has constantly objected to the use of carryovers for
tax avoidance, the 1954 changes also limit the availability of carry-
overs after specified transactions.
The 1954 amendments attempted to clarify ambiguities and mark
predictable limits." As with all complex legislation the 1954 Code
introduced some new and different ambiguities and elusive boun-
daries, 7 but it seemed a step forward. Then in 1958, with Libson
Shops," a new factor was interposed. Briefly, the Supreme Court told
us (and Congress) that the 1939 Code, which had been so intricately
patched and augmented, meant something quite different from what
it had seemed to mean in 1954.
The entity question was brought to the Supreme Court in Libson
Shops and was before Congress in connection with section 381 of the
1954 Code. In section 381 Congress provided that a net operating loss
deduction was one of nineteen tax attributes that followed the assets
of a corporation in a tax-free reorganization or liquidation. 9
" The number of years over which a net loss may be averaged has not remained con-
stant. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1061 (carryover one year; carry-
back one year); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204, 42 Stat. 231 (carryover extended to
two years; carryback eliminated); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, S 206, 43 Stat. 260
(same); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 206, 44 Stat. 17; Revenue Act of 1928,
ch. 852, § 117(b), 45 Stat. 825; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 117(b),47 Stat.
207 (carryforward reduced to one year); National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90,
§ 218(a), 48 Stat. 209 (1933) (carryover eliminated); Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 5§
26(c), 27(c), 52 Stat. 467 (carryover allowed for two years); Revenue Act of 1939, ch.
247, § 211, 53 Stat. 867 (this became § 122 of the 1939 Code and provided for a two
year carryover); Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 153, 56 Stat. 847 (carryback of two
years added); Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 215, 64 Stat. 937 (carryover extended to
five years, carryback reduced to one year); the 1954 Code kept the carryover of five years
and extended the carryback to three years.
"a Under the 1939 Code, no provision explicitly regulated the transfer of carryovers after
reorganizations. Section 381 (c) (1) specifically provides that these carryovers are transferable
subject, of course, to §§ 269 and 382.
"6For example, 5 382 of the 1954 Code specifically denotes certain transactions
which will prevent or reduce the use of carryovers. Section 269 was strengthened to provide
for a presumption of tax avoidance if the price paid for stock was disproportionately high.
17For example, the exact relationship between §§ 269 and 382 was not made clear.
If a transaction runs afoul of § 382(b), does this mean that § 269 does not apply? If this
is the result, then a taxpayer by using S 382(b) could sacrifice 20% of the carryover and
utilize the remaining amount in a transaction which might have been covered by § 269,
which would have disallowed the entire amount.
1353 U.S. 382 (1957), affirming, 229 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1956).
'" Section 381 of the 1954 Code provides in part:
General Rule: In the case of the acquisition of assets of a corporation by
another corporation-
(1) in a distribution to such other corporation to which section 332
(relating to liquidations of subsidiaries) applies, except in a case in which
the basis of the assets distributed is determined under section 334(b) (2) ; or
(2) in a transfer to which section 361 (relating to nonrecognition of
gain or loss to corporations) applies, but only if the transfer is in connection
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The availability of the carryover deduction no longer depended
upon which particular corporate entity survived, provided the re-
quirements of the Code provisions governing reorganizations and
liquidations were satisfied."
Meanwhile, in the courts, the entity question was being consid-
ered under the 1939 Code because the several Libson Shops compa-
nies had been merged before adoption of the 1954 Code. In Libson
Shops a group of individuals owned seventeen companies, sixteen of
which operated ladies' specialty stores in a chain, and the seventeenth
managed the rest. Three of the companies had net operating loss
carryovers. The seventeen companies were merged into one, and the
taxpayer claimed tax deductions for the unused carryovers against
the income of the single successor company. Section 129 was held
to be inapplicable because there was no finding that tax evasion or
avoidance was the principal purpose of the merger. The principal
point argued in the case, whether the post-merger corporation was
"the taxpayer" under section 122, was never reached by the Court.'
The Court focused instead on a second argument raised in the gov-
ernment's brief: whether Congress ever intended that the losses from
one business might, because of a merger (however legitimately mo-
tivated and accomplished), be used to offset the profits of another."
with a reorganization described in subparagraph (A), (C), (D) (but only
if the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 3 54(b) (1)
are met), or (F) of section 368 (a)(1),
the acquiring corporation shall succeed to and take into account, as of the close
of the day of distribution or transfer, the items described in subsection (c)
of the distributor or transferor corporation, subject to the conditions and
limtatons specified in subsections (b) and (c).
"By keying its application to § 368 tax free reorganizations and §§ 334 and
332 liquidations, § 381 thereby incorporates all of the rules and regulations regulating
these provisions. See BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS §§ 9.40- 9.44, 12.01- 12.12 (1964). The intricacies of these provisions are beyond
the scope of this article, and it will be assumed herein when discussing §§ 381 and 382 that
these provisions have been satisfied.
IS Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 385-86 (1957).
In support of its denial of the carry-over, the Government argues that this
statutory privilege is not available unless the corporation claiming it is the
same taxable entity as that which sustained the loss. In reliance on New Colo-
nial Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, and cases following it, the Government
argues that separately chartered corporations are not the same taxable entity.
Petitioner, on the other hand, relying on Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
306 U.S. 522, and cases following it, argues that a corporation resulting from
a statutory merger is treated as the same taxable entity as its constituents to
whose legal attributes it has succeeded by operation of state law. However,
we find it unnecessary to discuss this issue since an alternative argument made
by the Government is dispositive of this case.
12Id. at 386.
The Government contends that the carry-over privilege is not available
unless there is a continuity of business enterprise. It argues that the prior
year's loss can be offset against the current year's income only to the extent
that this income is derived from the operation of substantially the same
business which produced the loss. Only to that extent is the same "taxpayer"
involved.
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It concluded that Congress had not so intended; therefore, the three
stores' prior losses could not be used to offset post-merger profits of
the successful units. In footnote 9 the Court indicated that it was
not passing on single corporation cases where the carryover was
sought to be used by the company which had in fact incurred the
loss.
2a
Libson was clearly a new departure. The crucial question under
the 1939 Code was now not the entity problem which section 381
of the 1954 Code had solved. " Instead, the question was whether
there was a "continuity of business" which the Court found to be
the heart of the Libson case. The Court said:
The requirement of a continuity of business enterprise as applied to
this case is in accord with the legislative history of the carry-over and
carry-back provisions. Those provisions were enacted to ameliorate the
unduly drastic consequences of taxing income strictly on an annual
basis. They were designed to permit a taxpayer to set off its lean years
against its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable
income computed over a period longer than one year. There is, however,
no indication in their legislative history that these provisions were de-
signed to permit the averaging of the pre-merger losses of one business
with the post-merger income of some other business which had been
operated and taxed separately before the merger. What history there is
suggests that Congress primarily was concerned with the fluctuating
income of a single business.2"
The question, therefore, is the extent to which the 1954 legisla-
tion disposed of the continuity of business question posed by Libson
Shops. Section 381 of the 1954 Code had been supplemented by two
provisions which dealt with continuity on somewhat different terms
than did the Court. First, under section 382 (b) the survival of loss
carryovers in corporate reorganizations depended upon the fraction
of the surviving corporation owned by the former owners of the
loss corporation." The available loss carryover was reduced pro rata
if the continued equity interest was less than twenty per cent. For
2 ld. at 390:
We do not pass on situations like those presented in Northway Securities
Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 532; Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner,
11 T. C. 240; A.B. &5 Container Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 842;
W A G E, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T. C. 249. In these cases a single cor-
porate taxpayer changed the character of its business and the taxable income
of one of its enterprises was reduced by the deductions or credits of another.
(Emphasis in original.)
24 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
2SLibson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386-387 (1957).
26Section 382(b) of the 1954 Code provides in part:
(1) IN GENERAL.-If, in the case of a reorganization specified in paragraph
(2) of section 381(a), the transferor corporation or the acquiring corpora-
tion-
(A) has a net operating loss which is a net operating loss carryover to
[Vol. 20:258
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example, if the stockholders of the loss company owned only ten per
cent of the surviving company (whether the survivor was techni-
cally their old corporation or some other entity), then only half of
the carryover was available.
Second, section 382 (a), unlike section 382 (b), dealt with changes
outside the scope of section 381: it provided that if, by purchase,
fifty per cent or more of the stock of a corporation had changed
hands and a trade or business substantially the same as that previous-
ly conducted had not continued, then the carryovers would be dis-
allowed.27 The legislative history and the subsequent regulations make
the first taxable year of the acquiring corporation ending after the date of
transfer, and
(B) the stockholders (immediately before the reorganization) of such
corporation (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "loss corpora-
tion"), as the result of owning stock of the loss corporation, own (immedi-
ately after the reoragnization) less than 20 percent of the fair market value
of the outstanding stock of the acquiring corporation,
the total net operating loss carryover from prior txable years of the loss cor-
poration to the first taxable year of the acquiring corporation ending after the
date of transfer shall be reduced by the percentage determined under para-
graph (2).
(2) REDUCTION OF NET OPERATING LOSS CARRYOVER.-The reduction ap-
plicable under paragraph (1) shall be the percentage determined by subtracting
from 100 percent-
(A) the percent of the fair market value of the outstanding stock of the
acquiring corporation owned (immediately after the reorganization) by the
stockholders (immediately before the reorganization) of the loss corporation,
as the result of owning stock of the loss corporation, multiplied by
(B) five.
27 Section 382(a) of the 1954 Code provides in part:
(1) IN GENERAL.-If, at the end of a taxable year of a corporation-
(A) any one or more of those persons described in paragraph (2) own
a percentage of the total fair market value of the outstanding stock of such
corporation which is at least 50 percentage points more than such person
or persons owned at-
(i) the beginning of such taxable year, or
(ii) the beginning of the prior taxable year,
(B) the increase in percentage points at the end of such taxable year is
attributable to-
(i) a purchase by such person or persons of such stock, the stock of
another corporation owning stock in such corporation, or an interest in
a partnership or trust owning stock in such corporation, or
(ii) a decrease in the amount of such stock outstanding or the amount
of stock outstanding of another corporation owning stock in such cor-
poration, except a decrease resulting from a redemption to pay death taxes
to which section 303 applies, and
(C) such corporation has not continued to carry on a trade or business
substantially the same as that conducted before any change in the percentage
ownership of the fair market value of such stock,
the net operating loss carryovers, if any, from prior taxable years of such cor-
poration to such taxable year and subsequent taxable years shall not be in-
cluded in the net operating loss deduction for such taxable year and subsequent
taxable years.
A percentage point change in ownership is not equivalent to a per cent change in ownership.
Thus, if A owns ten shares out of 100 shares outstanding, he owns 10% of the stock and
ten percentage points. If A later acquires ten additional shares, he has increased his holdings
by 100%, but has increased his percentage points by only ten,
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it clear that the "business" referred to in section 382 (a) means the
specific economic activity of the company, in terms of product, facil-
ities, customers, location, etc."s However, the committee reports indi-
cate that the subsequent addition of a different business would not
upset the carryover, provided the old business is continued. There
is no requirement that the continued business be the one in which
the loss was incurred, merely that it be the one which was being con-
ducted before the stock purchase.
Although both sections 382(a) and 382 (b) deal with essentially
the same subject, the survival of the carryover in the face of sub-
stantial changes in interest, the philosophies of the two provisions are
different and somewhat inconsistent. A one-half change in interest
in a single continuing corporation by purchase of stock requires
continuation of the loss business under section 381 (a); whereas
under section 381 (b) a greater change of interest in a tax free reor-
ganization requires no continuation of the business. These disparate
treatments of essentially the same material further exemplify the
hazards of attempts to discover solutions in this field.
The conjunction of the Libson Shops decision with the 1954
amendments produced understandable confusion because to a certain
28S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1954):
If, as a result of such an increase, the corporation shifts from one type of
business to another, discontinues any except a minor portion of its business,
changes its location, or otherwise fails to carry on substantially the same trade
or business as was conducted before such an increase, then the condition in
subparagraph (C) is met.
Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h)(5) & (6) provide:
(5) In determining whether a corporation has not continued to carry on a
trade or business substantially the same as that conducted before any increase
in the ownership of its stock, all the facts and circumstances of the particular
case shall be taken into account. Among the relevant factors to be taken into
account are changes in the corporation's employees, plant, equipment, product,
location, customer, and other items which are significant in determining
whether there is, or is not, a continuity of the same business enterprise. These
factors shall be evaluated in the light of the general objective of section 382(a)
to disallow net operating loss carryovers where there is a purchase of the stock
of a corporation and its loss carryovers are used to offset gains of a business
unrelated to that which produced the losses. However, the prohibited utilization
of net operating loss carryovers to offset gains of a business unrelated to that
which produced the losses is not dependent upon considerations of purpose,
motive, or intent, but rather is established by the objective facts of the par-
ticular case. The principles set forth in this subparagraph shall be applied
in accordance with the rules set forth in the following subparagraphs of this
paragraph.
(6) A corporation has not continued to carry on a trade or business sub-
stantially the same as that conducted before any increase in the ownership of
its stock if the corporation is not carrying on an active trade or business at
the time of such increase in ownership. Thus, if the corporation is inactive at
the time of such an increase and subsequently is reactivated in the same line
of business as that originally conducted, the corporation has not continued to
carry on a trade or business substantially the same as that conducted before
such increase in stock ownership.
LIBSON SHOPS
extent the scope and meaning of the decision itself was not clear. As
to the future of Libson Shops, there are three chief possibilities:
(1) The 1954 legislation superseded Libson Shops; therefore, the
doctrine has only one historical significance except for undecided
cases under the 1939 Code; or
(2) Libson Shops has full force; therefore, the Code provisions
only limit loss carryover deductions which survive the Libson Shops
test; or
(3) Libson Shops survives in part and is superseded in part under
the 1954 Code.
The threshold question is the meaning of Libson Shops. What was
meant by the Court when it limited the application of carryovers
to profits of the "same business" which actually incurred the losses?
What were the decisive elements of continuity? The facts of the
case gave a partial, negative answer. First, the type of economic
activity was not significant because all the Libson shops were, and
continued to be, in the "same business" as that phrase is used in
plain English. Second, identity of ownership was not decisive since
the stockholders of all the Libson corporations were substantially
the same. Third, the form of corporate entity was not decisive; in
fact, that basis for decision was expressly brushed aside by the
Court." Two comments by the Court confused the situation some-
what. First, the Court said that the matter would have been differ-
ent if the corporations had chosen to file consolidated income tax
returns,3' apparently overlooking the absence of any common parent
corporation, which disqualified the group from filing consolidated
returns. 1 Second, in footnote 9, 2 the Court noted that it was not
passing upon single corporation cases where a taxpayer sought to
apply its own loss carryover to profits earned after a change in busi-
ness or ownership. Was the Court merely stating the obvious, sug-
gesting that the Libson Shops rule was limited to cases involving
corporate reorganizations, or was it not warning corporate tax-
payers who had shifted the benefit of carryovers without reorganiz-
ing to take heed?
Many of the cases which followed and relied upon Libson Shops
did little to clarify or explain what had been cryptic or problemat-
ical in the decision. One group is typified by Mill Ridge Coal v. Pat-
terson," the earliest case to follow Libson Shops. The taxpayer had
29 See note 21 supra.
" Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. at 38.
3' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1504(a).
32 See note 23 supra.
33264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959).
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been a dormant corporate shell whose only "asset" was a net operat-
ing loss carryover. The taxpayer sought to utilize this carryover
against the profits of a new enterprise. The new business had been
contributed by persons who had purchased the company after it had
incurred the losses. The only connection between the former busi-
ness and the one before the court was the corporate entity. The
carryover was disallowed on the authority of Libson Shops. However,
Libson was probably used instead of section 129 of the 1939 Code
because that section required proof that the principal purpose of the
purchase was tax avoidance. Mill Ridge and similar cases" did not
analyze the difficult outer limits of the Libson Shops rationale nor
did they amplify its inner meaning. Such cases did dispel any notion
which might have been attributable to footnote 9' that the contin-
uity of the corporate entity prevented the application of the Libson
Shops rule.
A more interesting group of cases dealt with Libson Shops' appli-
cation to corporate taxpayers which were not obvious shells. As in
war, the early communiques tend to be misleading, and in some of
these cases there was a tendency to use, or at least speak of, pre-
Libson Shops standards when that case came to be applied. For ex-
ample, in Kolker Bros., Inc.," a corporation in the retail grocery and
liquor business had lost money. The president and principal stock-
holder of the corporation was a minority stockholder in another
company in the hotel provision supply business. The retail corpora-
tion purchased the assets of the hotel supply corporation for cash
(largely borrowed) and began to make money in its hotel supply
business. After a few months the losing retail business was sold. The
issue was whether the taxpayer could carry over its net operating
loss for prior years from the retail grocery business and deduct it
from the income earned in the hotel supply business. The Commis-
sioner, relying on Libson Shops and Mill Ridge, denied the deduction.
The Tax Court, on the basis of footnote 9, held in favor of the
" For example, in Commissioner v. Virginia Metal Products, Inc., 290 F.2d 675 (3d Cir.
1961), the shares of Winfield, the loss corporation, were acquired by Virginia, which caused
the assets of Winfield to be sold and then placed its assets in the shell and continued its
prior business. Here again § 129 of the 1939 Code was held to be inapplicable, and the same
corporate entity which had incurred the loss was seeking the deduction. The taxpayer relying
on footnote 9 argued that the continuity prevented the application of Libson Shops. The
Court rejected this argument at 677 by holding: "The taxpayer's hopeful reliance on foot-
note 9 . . . is misplaced. The Supreme Court was simply confining its decision to the facts
before it. But the thrust of that decision easily includes such as case as this." The court
cited: Bookwalter v. Hutchens Metal Products, Inc., 281 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1960); Mill
Ridge Coal v. Patterson, supra note 33; and Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249
F.2d 776 (7thCir. 1957).
as See note 23 supra.
635 T.C. 299 (1960).
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deduction." The Tax Court indicated that Libson Shops should not
apply in a case such as Kolker, where the corporation with the loss
carryover was applying it to later profits. The Tax Court also held
that the hotel supply business and the retail grocery business were
mere variations on the purveying of edibles so that the loss and profits
came from the same business. As a result the Tax Court concluded
that although there had been a change in the character of the busi-
ness, there had been none in its "essential nature," so that Libson did
not apply.
The Second Circuit first dealt with the Libson Shops problem in
Norden-Ketay Corp. v. Commissioner." A firm of investment
bankers bought ninety-five per cent of the stock of a coal mining
company. The mining assets were sold at a loss which augmented a
net operating loss for the same year (1951). The company partial-
ly liquidated by distributing most of the sale proceeds and remained
dormant for two years. It then purchased on credit three closely
held companies in the electronics business and liquidated them; the
former stockholders of the three companies purchased newly issued
stock of the old mining company, which later sought to apply the
carryover to profits from the electronics businesses. This was dis-
allowed. The court's reasoning echoes the second holding in Kolker
in that the decisive factors were said to be the absence of continuity
of enterprise, i.e., the difference between coal mining and electron-
ics,"9 and the absence of continuity of stock ownership." The court
observed that the only link between the coal company and the tax-
payer before it was the corporate entity, which was not, according
to the "basic teaching" of Libson Shops, enough to preserve the loss
deduction."' The court did not attempt any further analysis of the
"basic teaching" of Libson Shops; so we must draw our conclusions
from the facts.
The irrelevance of the corporate entity was further emphasized in
two 1964 cases in the Second Circuit, which like Libson Shops in-
volved retail stores. In Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner4 2 the
court held that Libson Shops is not rendered inapplicable by the fact
that the surviving corporation which seeks the deduction is the same
corporation that incurred the losses. The court pointed out that the
Libson decision turned not on the survivorship of the corporate en-
tity but on the continuity of business enterprise. The decision fur-
3Id. at 305 (1960).
'8319 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1963).
"Id. at 905.
41 Id. at 905-06.
41 rd. at 906.
42335 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1964).
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ther declared that, although it was difficult to state just what con-
stituted sufficient continuity of enterprise, Libson Shops controlled
the case at bar, the only difference being that the owners of that
loss corporation had less stock than the one hundred per cent owner-
ship of the Libson Shops loss corporation. The result of the Garfinck-
el case was emphasized in Allied Central Stores, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner."' The several department store corporations, all one hundred
per cent owned by a parent, were merged into the petitioner, the loss
corporation, and the loss was denied on the authority of Libson
Shops.
The Tax Court's 1964 decision in the Humacid case" and the
Florida District Court's 1963 decision in Foremost Dairies" are per-
haps the most helpful of the 1939 Code cases in suggesting the real
meaning of Libson.
The Humacid Company was organized in 1951 to develop an idea
for a lining for oil well drill holes. Huntsinger owned twenty-five
per cent of the stock in Humacid and was its principal creditor. The
company incurred losses. In 1953 and 1954 Huntsinger acquired all
of the stock and debt of Humacid and caused a family partnership
controlled by him to transfer to the company the operating assets
of an oil well service business. The court held, on the authority of
Libson Shops, that Humacid was not entitled to carry over the losses
previously incurred by it and to deduct them from profits earned by
the business formerly conducted l y the partnership. The taxpayer
urged two reasons why Libson should not prevent the utilization of
the carryover: (1) there was no significant change in economic activi-
ties as between the loss business and the newly contributed business,
and (2) there was no significant change in ownership since by rea-
son of Huntsinger's creditor position he effectively owned all of the
company prior to his acquisition of the balance of the stock and
the contribution of the partnership business.'
As to petitioner's first point the court found that the two busi-
nesses were not the same. The court further concluded, relying upon
the facts of Libson Shops and Garfinckel, that the doctrine of Lib-
son Shops "has nothing whatsoever to do with changes in the nature
of the business, or the economic activities, of a corporation claiming
a deduction for a net operating loss."47
43339 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1964).
44The Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894 (1964).
4SForemost Dairies, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5426 (M.D. Fla. 1963),
aff'd, 341 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1965). The court of appeals decision does not add to the anal-
ysis of the district court, for it holds that the district court properly applied Libson Shops.
"The Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894, 905 (1964).
47 Id. at 906.
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Judge Fay was more troubled by the claim that there had been no
substantial change in stock ownership since the losses were incurred;
some of the difficulty was caused by the dictum in Norden-Ketay
which suggested that continuity of equity was a decisive factor in
applying Libson Shops.4" First noting that there was complete identi-
ty of stock ownership in Libson Shops and Garfinckel, the court also
rejected the argument that the creditor of an insolvent corporation
was the substantial owner for Libson Shops purposes. It does not
seem, however, that the case would have been decided otherwise even
if Huntsinger had owned all the stock from the beginning, in view
of the language of the opinion which precedes the discussion of con-
tinuity of equity: "It seems to us that what the Supreme Court had
in mind in Libson Shops, Inc. was something more in the nature of
an economic concept prohibiting separate business units from com-
bining so that profits from one separate enterprise might be offset
against the losses of another."49 It concluded that under these facts
the gains derived from the business of the former partnership "did
not arise from the same business unit which produced the losses."5
In Foremost Dairies51 both the profit and the loss corporations, Fore-
most Dairies and Maxson Food System respectively, were engaged
in the processing and distribution of food. In 1946-48 Maxson lost
money. In 1949 Foremost was merged into Maxson, and the latter
immediately changed its name to Foremost. The court rejected the
argument that continuation of the loss corporation prevented the
application of Libson. In analyzing the scope of Libson the court
said:
The Court is of the opinion that the continuity of business enterprise
theory in Libson Shops means that where a loss corporation and a gain
corporation are merged, pre-merger losses may be offset against post-
merger gains only to the extent that the business which was previously
operating at a loss is now operating at a profit. Furthermore, the business
referred to in the sentence above does not mean the formal legal entity
but rather the bundle of assets which previously constituted the pre-
merger business unit."
"'Norden-Ketay Corp. v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1963):
[T]he second major factor in determining the existence of continuity of
business enterprise [is] . . . continuity of stock ownership. Where there is
continuity of ownership, there might well be justice in allowing a loss carry-
over even though there has been a complete change in the nature of corporate
activity. The purposes of the statute are ultimately directed toward granting
a legitimate tax advantage to the shareholders behind the corporate entity.
"The Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894, 907 (1964).
5 I1d. at 908.
5 Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5426 (M.D. Fla. 1963),
aff'd, 341 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1965).
" 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d at 5429.
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Because the assets attributable to Maxson did produce profits in one
year, the court allowed the loss deduction to those profits."
Any effort to state a positive rationale for Libson is necessarily
speculative because few of the cases express positive rules. Rather,
most of the cases, like Libson itself, tend to give us only a negative
application: The facts in the case before the court for some unan-
nounced reason do or do not violate the intent of Congress in allow-
ing loss carryovers. One recalls Judge Friendly's remark in the Gar-
finckel opinion, speaking of the variety of cases which appeared to
involve the Libson rule:
We would indeed be hard put to devise a formula that would deter-
mine just where in this spectrum the Libson Shops line would fall. We
can make only the unilluminating statement that in a transaction in
which a 58% owner of a loss corporation causes it to acquire a wholly
owned profit corporation, with a consequent increase in its ownership
of the survivor to 95%, the discontinuity between the before and the
after seems sufficient to cause the case to be attracted by Libson Shops.
If we have misunderstood that opinion, we would be even more than
usually willing to be corrected, since there is much appeal in Garfinckle's
58% ownership of DePinna during the years of the losses, although the
Commissioner counters that in Libson Shops there was complete identity
in stock ownership before and after merger.54
Before attempting an analysis of the role of Libson Shops under
the 1954 Code, a working theory is required. We suggest the follow-
ing: where business units were so separated that the investment com-
mitted to one of them was insulated from economic burden of losses
incurred by the other, then no transaction may be relied upon to
bring the resulting loss carryovers into conjunction with gains from
the other in order to obtain tax relief from those losses which might
have been secured if the units had been separated while the losses
were incurred, either actually or by the filing of consolidated returns.
Under this formulation, the reach of Libson Shops does not depend
on type of business activity, continuity of stock ownership, or tax
avoidance intent, nor on the form of transaction or structure where-
by the carryover is brought together with the profits. Instead, the
focus is entirely on the exposure of an investment in an enterprise
to the loss sought to be deducted. At least, this generalization ac-
counts for the disallowance of the carryovers in cases involving the
sa Libson Shops prohibits one economic entity from utilizing the loss carryovers of an-
other entity; one can wonder why, then, the Treasury, in Treas. Reg., § 1.1502-31 (d) and in
its Proposed Reg. § 1.1502-21, allows carryover loss deductions when a consolidated return
is filed. The only explanation which can legitimately account for this apparent inconsistency
is that under the statutory authority of §§ 1501-04 of the 1954 Code such separate in-
vestment units as qualify may utilize these net operating loss carryovers.
"Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 744, 748-49 (2d Cir. 1964).
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merger or consolidation of corporations under common ownership 5
and comprehends numerous classes of cases "where new stockholders
have poured profitable assets into a loss corporation that had aban-
doned or nearly abandoned its business."'0 This generalization would
justify the result in Humacid, where a separate partnership busi-
ness was contributed to the loss corporation by one who may or may
not have been the previous owner of both, and in Foremost, where
two corporations having no prior connection with each other were
merged." It would not justify Kolker Brothers, where the family
wholesale business was purchased with borrowed capital by the fam-
ily retail corporation which had the loss carryover, since that capital
had not been exposed to the losses of the retail business." So one who
is persuaded by the suggested formulation of the Libson Shops ra-
tionale must also approve the Service's nonacquiescence" in Kolker.
This formulation is consistent with the Service's 1963 ruling
(63-40) that Libson Shops did not prevent a corporation which had
incurred a net operating loss, attributable in part to the sale of its
assets, from utilizing that loss against profits from businesses pur-
chased with the proceeds of the sale."' There the investment which
made possible the profits was the translation of that which had been
subject to the losses. This ruling is consistent with the Norden-Ketay
case because there the investment in the loss business was paid out
to the stockholders before the capital for the purchased profitable
business was supplied in the form of credit by the sellers."'
The proposed theory suggests that a parent corporation with a loss
ought to be able to merge or liquidate a profitable subsidiary and
apply the loss against future profits of the subsidiary, since among
the assets exposed to the parent's losses was the investment in the
former subsidiary. On the other hand, it suggests that a profitable
parent could not, under Libson Shops, merge or liquidate a loss sub-
sidiary and enjoy the carryover, since the parent's assets had been
insulated from the subsidiary's losses.
It would also seem that under the 1939 Code as explained in
Libson Shops one hundred per cent of the stock of a loss corporation
could change hands and the assets of that company be reinvested in a
new profitable business to which, insofar as Libson Shops is concerned,
" Allied Central Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1964); Julius Gar-
finckel & Co. v. Commissioner, note 54 supra.
"Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner, note 55 supra, at 749.
' The Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894 (1964); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 12
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5426 (M.D. Fla. 1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1965).
sKolker Bros., Inc., 35 T.C. 299 (1960).
" 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 5.
60Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 47.
61 Norden-Ketay Corp. v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1963).
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the loss carryover should be allowed. Revenue Ruling 63-40 suggests,
however, that a substantial change in stock ownership might invoke
Libson Shops in such a case. But as we have noted, Libson was not
concerned with either change in ownership or type of business activ-
ity. What is denounced is the injection of a new investment in busi-
ness assets, as in Norden-Ketay.' Perhaps the Service shied away from
seeming to approve the utilization of the carryover in a type of case
which ordinarily involves the prohibited intent of section 129 of the
1939 Code.
While it cannot be safely asserted that the formula proposed would
necessarily be applied with mathematical precision, we are satisfied
that it expresses the philosophy behind Libson Shops as applied in
that case and others- in which it has been mentioned. What then is
the part which that rule plays under the 1954 Code? Was it re-
placed, supplemented, or only modified?
Conventional legal logic would seem to compel the conclusion that
section 382 supersedes the Libson rule for 1954 Code cases, for in
the interpretation of statutes, specific legislative action takes prece-
dence over judicial inference as to legislative intention, and certainly
section 382 deals with much the same subject matter as the Libson
Shops rule. This argument in holding Libson Shops repealed is not
enough because it conceals some of the difficulties in applying logic to
this situation in quite the manner proposed.
Congress could not have intended (in the psychological sense) to
repeal Libson Shops because the case was undecided in 1954. How-
ever, this timing factor is not enough to show that Libson survived
under the 1954 Code; Congress knew of the difficulties in imple-
menting section 129 of the 1939 Code. It deliberately regulated the
survival of net operating loss carryovers in the context of various
corporate modifications by the amendment of section 129 and the
enactment of sections 381 and 382. Because Congress was unaware
of the Libson Shops rule, we may conclude that if Congress intended
that there be such a rule, it would have been included in the 1954
amendments. Therefore, the failure to do so is some evidence that
what was enacted was intended to be exclusive.
This argument has particular force in the light of sections 381
and 382 (b). Before 1954, the Code did not specifically allow carry-
over deductions to follow assets transferred in a reorganization like
the one in Libson Shops. Section 381 for the first time allows the loss
deduction to follow assets without regard to corporate identity, and




under 381(a). It would seem, therefore, that Congress must have
conceived of transactions coming within section 381 as being regu-
lated for the first time by the 1954 Code, so that the specific limita-
tions enacted must have been thought of as standing alone. Against
this analysis, however, is the fact that both sections 382(a) and
382 (b) also affect carryovers which do not depend upon section
381 at all, i.e., where the loss corporation is the one claiming the
deduction.
Another argument can be drawn from the place of the Libson
Shops rule within the architecture of the statute. Libson Shops was
an interpretation of section 122 of the 1939 Code, the underlying
carryover provision, which was not substantively amended by the
1954 Code."3 The Court found that the words of that section meant
that all carryovers were limited when applied to enterprises which
were different from those in which the losses were incurred.
Since all carryover deductions are derived from section 122, it is
noteworthy that the court did not find in the co-existing limitations
of section 129 of the 1939 Code an obstacle to its interpretation of
the fundamental meaning of section 122. It can, therefore, be argued
that the limitations of section 382 (and 269) of the 1954 Code bear
only upon carryovers which have survived the inherent limitations
of section 172 of the Code which were disclosed by the Libson
Shops decision.
The preceding discussion has shown that the policies and reach
of Libson Shops and section 382 of the 1954 Code are different.
Libson Shops would disallow some deductions which are not touched
by section 382, would not disallow other carryovers which are
not touched by section 382, and would not disallow other carryovers
which are specifically disallowed by that section. For example, under
section 382(a) a corporation which has undergone the specified
change in stock ownership, at the cost of continuing the loss busi-
ness activity for a limited period, is not prevented by section 382 (a)
from applying the loss from that activity to a newly added enter-
prise. Libson Shops was not concerned with change in stock owner-
ship or continuation of the particular business but rather with the
relationship of the investment in the loss enterprise to that in the
enterprise to which the loss is sought to be applied. So this rule might,
"3 The actual words interpreted in Libson Shops, "the taxpayer," were, however, not car-
ried from § 122 of the 1939 Code to § 172 of the 1954 Code. Although no specific reason
was given for this deletion in the committee reports, the change may have been made to
allow corporations under § 381 of the 1954 Code to utilize the deduction; or it may have
been purely a drafting technique to have § 172 conform to other deduction sections, e.g.,
§§ 162, 163 and 164 of the 1954 Code. In either event, it does not appear that this change
was meant to change the susstantive meaning of S 122 of the 1939 Code.
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as in the Humacid case, result in the disallowance of a carryover
deduction against an added business which was not disallowed by
section 382 (a).
Similarly, disallowance under section 382 (b) depends upon a loss
of stock ownership in the surviving corporation by owners of the
component loss corporation after a reorganization, whereas in the
Libson Shops case one hundred per cent continuity of stock owner-
ship in a merger did not shield the carryover.
How then do these differences between the Libson rule and the
limitations of section 382 affect what we have called the conventional
argument that section 382 must be interpreted as having repealed
Libson because it is a specific enactment with respect to the same
subject matter?
There are, to say the least, competing answers. Since the two rules
do not reach the same cases (except by coincidence) it can be
argued that the particular rules of section 382, like the rules of
section 269, supplement Libson Shops rather than replace it. How-
ever, because each case under section 382 raises the Lisbon Shops issue,
it can be argued that the differences are consistent with the conclu-
sion that section 382 is: exclusive. In actual cases, a holding that
Libson Shops survived under the 1954 Code may give some rather
startling results. For example, where after a reorganization the
owners of the loss corporation own only ten per cent of the surviv-
ing corporation, one-half of the carryover disappears under section
382(b), and if, e.g., a B-type reorganization" were used, Libson Shops
would destroy any loss which could not be offset against the profits
of enterprise of the loss corporation or profits from the proceeds of
the disposition of that enterprise. In the Libson Shops situation itself,
the carryover would survive section 382 (b) in full (because of the
100 per cent continuity of stock ownership) but would nevertheless
be applicable only to profits from the stores which produced the
loss in the first place. Similarly, under section 382 (a) a carryover
could survive because of the continuance of the loss business but
under Libson Shops would be applicable only to profits from that
business or to a new one derived from the investment of the old one.
The resulting pile-up of obstacles to the utilization of loss carryovers
is not very tidy, which no doubt favors the argument that Congress
intended section 382 to be exclusive. But section 269 applies to most
of the cases covered by section 382 and disallows some but not all
of the losses which escape the 1954 limitations, thereby detracting
somewhat from the force of an argument based on neatness.
4 See note 72 infra and accompanying text.
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Because the limitations of section 382 do not actually cover the
same ground as the Libson Shops rule, the differences are deep enough
to give weight to an argument that the 1954 amendments should
not be held to have displaced Libson Shops. The Government so ar-
gued in Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner,: the principal case
thus far in which the application of Libson Shops under the 1954
Code has been contested." The Government chose an appealing case,
from its point of view. The Maxwell Hardware Corporation had sus-
tained a $1,000,000 loss in the hardware business. Two real estate de-
velopers who had no previous connection with the company purchased
non-voting preferred stock in the loss company, the proceeds of
which were used to set up and operate a separate real estate depart-
ment from which the profits were sought to be offset by the hard-
ware carryover. The hardware business was discontinued. Under an
agreement the real estate department had to be continued for six
years and thereafter if it were discontinued at the election of either
the common stockholders or the preferred stockholders, ninety per
cent of the value of its assets had to be used to redeem the preferred
stock. The effect of the agreement was that the preferred stock-
holders were put in a position to obtain on the ultimate redemption
of the preferred stock, assuming profits in the real estate depart-
ment, what they invested plus the real estate profits, shielded from
income tax to the extent of the carryover. Section 269 did not apply
because of the amount of stock obtained by the real estate men, nor
did section 382 (a) because it was non-voting stock. Thus the ques-
tion was squarely presented: did Libson Shops apply?
The Tax Court held that it did, saying: "We cannot credit to
Congress the issuance of an invitation to indulge in a practice which
the stated purpose of the enactment is to control, the 'trafficking' in
net operating loss carryovers." ' In further detail the court noted the
6' 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965), reversing, Arthur T. Beckett, 41 T.C. 386 (1963).
" Two other cases have applied Libson under the 1954 Code. Although they split as to
its application under the 1954 Code, neither elaborately analyzed the reasons for its de-
cision. In Jackson Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1964)
the court allowed the taxpayer to take the carryover deduction for years 1953 and 1954
despite the influx of new capital into the corporate shell. The court at 783 said, with respect
to Libson Shops' application under the 1954 Code: "Several courts have now applied the
Libson Shops doctrine to 1954 Code years where a taxpayer has sought to carry forward
pre-1954 losses. . . .We are of the opinion, however, that the Libson Shops doctrine, even
if applicable, does not prohibit the taxpayer in this case from deducting the 1953 and 1954
losses." In Euclid-Tennessee, Inc. v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1965), the court
held that the taxpayer had not continued the loss business as required by § 382(a). As to
Libson Shops' application to the 1954 Code, the court said: "We cannot and do not read
Libson into the 1954 Code, but its broad principles may be relevant except as the 1954
Code, under limited conditions, permits what the 1939 Code, construed by Libson, forbade."
Supra at 994.
"
7 Arthur T .Beckett, 41 T.C. 386, 418 (1963).
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time difference between the 1954 Code amendments and the Libson
Shops decision as showing that Congress could not have intended to
reverse the case."s Judge Scott was also impressed by the fact that
Libson dealt with section 122, which was not "substantively"
amended by the 1954 Code."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It con-
cluded:
Libson Shops, decided under the 1939 Act, is no longer law. It has
been superseded by the 1954 Internal Revenue Code which, in Section
382, dealt specifically and differently with the concept of continuity
of business enterprise upon which the Libson Shops decision was based.
Taxation is peculiarly a matter of statutory law, and in applying that
law to the determination and computation of income and deductions,
the Courts do not make moral judgments. There is nothing perfidious
or invidious in enjoying a statutory deduction from reportable income.
It is not a matter of conscience but of statute and the determination of
Congressional intent. In our opinion, Congress had quite plainly said
that net operating loss deductions should be allowed unless the special
circumstances interpreted within the letter and spirit of Section 382 (a)
and 269 obtain. The conditions disallowing the deduction have not been
established here. It is of much more importance that businessmen, ac-
countants, lawyers and revenue agents should retain confidence that
plain statutory language means what it says and what it reasonably
implies than that a particular deficiency assessment should be sustained.
We cannot, within the statutory framework applying a fair and reason-
able interpretation to the language used, disallow to Maxwell Hardware
the net operating loss deduction."
The Tax Court has not so far been persuaded by the Ninth Circuit
analysis. In the recent Clarksdale Rubber case"' it dealt again with
the question of Libson Shops under the 1954 Code and further ex-
plored the niche which it had unsuccessfully sought to carve out in
Maxwell Hardware. The loss corporation in Clarksdale Rubber, in
order to solve financial problems, leased its operations and facilities
to a sister subsidiary of the purchaser of its stock, later acquiring
them back and operating at a profit against which it deducted pre-
vious carryovers. The Tax Court rejected the application of Libson
Shops for two reasons. First, it felt that even under the 1939 Code
the Libson doctrine would have been inapplicable because the busi-
ness which supplied both the gains and losses was the same despite the
interval of inactivity and the change of ownership. The court actual-
ly held that since the new owners had purchased one hundred per cent
"Id. at 416.
"Id. at 417-18.7
°Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 713, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1965).
"' Clarksdale Rubber Co., 45 T.C. (No. 22) (1965).
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of the taxpayer's stock the case fell under section 382 (a). Therefore,
the loss was not disqualified because the same business activities had
been continued. The Tax Court reasoned that where section 382 was
not applicable, Libson Shops applied under the 1954 Code. Thus in
Clarksdale Rubber, because there was more than a fifty percentage
point change in stock ownership, section 382 rather than Libson ap-
plied. This reasoning leads to the absurd implication that in such a
case a carryover might be saved by section 382 (by continuing a loss
business) which might otherwise be lost under Libson, where less
than the requisite amount of voting stock changed hands, as in
Maxwell Hardware.
The transition from Libson Shops to Maxwell Hardware describes
a downward course for the career of the Libson rule, but the Internal
Revenue Service has been proceeding in a different direction.
In 1958, shortly after Libson, the Service stated in Revenue Ruling
58-603 that it would not apply the case "under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 as to a merger or any other transaction described in
section 381(a)."" In response to the Maxwell Hardware opinion,
however, it has stated in a 1965 ruling"3 that Libson Shops "retains
vitality" under the 1954 Code in interpreting the application of sec-
tion 172. The ruling suggests that the ambit of section 382 is lim-
ited to certain situations involving abuses that were specifically
brought to the attention of Congress. Thus, says the Service, it will
apply Libson Shops in any loss carryover case under the 1954 Code
not contemplated by the announcement in Revenue Ruling 58-603,
C.B. 1958-2, 147, where there has been both a 50 percent or more shift
in the benefits of a loss carryover (whether direct or indirect and in-
cluding transactions having the effect of shifting the benefit of the loss
by shifting assets, stock, profit interests or other valuable rights) and
a change in business as defined in section 382 (a) and regulations there-
under. The Service will not rely on Libson Shops under the 1954 Code
in any loss carryover case where there has been less than a 50 percent
change in the beneficial ownership of the loss or where there has been
no change in business as defined in section 382(a) and the regulations
thereunder."4
From this language, the retained vitality of Libson Shops is diffi-
cult to discern. The exception for cases contemplated by Revenue
Ruling 58-603 eliminates the application of Libson Shops to most
corporate mergers, liquidations and other tax free reorganizations.
72 Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 147, reaffirmed in Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2
CUM. BULL. 475. With qualifications, the reorganizations covered by 381 (a) are the A, C,
D and F types.




That the doctrine will be invoked where there has been more than
a fifty per cent change in the ownership of the loss corporation
combined with a change in business under section 382 (a) is curious
because there is no particular connection between those conditions
and the Libson Shops rule. Perhaps these conditions can be interpre-
ted to mean that the Service would litigate another case like Max-
well Hardware, where different investment units have been brought
together but where the transaction avoids all the limitations of sec-
tion 382, in the hope of persuading another circuit to line up with
the Tax Court.
Although the view of the Tax Court and the Service are super-
ficially the same, in that Libson is recognized as having some
force within the interstices of the provisions of sections 269 and
382, there are, however, differences between the interpretations of
the present vitality of Libson put forth by the Tax Court and the
Service. The Tax Court's view is that if the conditions for the invo-
cation of section 382 are present (purchase of half the stock of a
corporation or execution of a reorganization) then Libson Shops will
not apply, and the availability of the carryover will depend on con-
tinuance of the old business under 382 (a) or the per cent of equity
of the stockholders of the loss company under section 382(b). If
these threshold conditions are not present, then apparently Libson
Shops applies as before. The Service's view is consistent with the
Tax Court insofar as reorganizations and liquidations are concerned,
but for other transactions the Service indicates that a change in busi-
ness activity within the meaning of section 382(a), coupled with
more than a fifty per cent change in the beneficial interest in the
carryover, invokes the Libson Shops rule. It does not seem useful to
measure one view against the other because both seem to be quite
wrong. Libson Shops, after all, was an interpretation of section 122
of the 1939 Code, the underlying section of the statute which still
creates (section 172) the loss carryover deduction; it was a finding
that Congress intended certain limits on the utilization of that deduc-
tion, when a different investment unit than the one which had in-
curred the loss intended to use the deduction. The inherent limita-
tion thus necessarily applied to all carryovers, whether or not they
happened to have been involved in reorganizations, corporations
whose stock was sold, or corporations which underwent no signifi-
cant changes at all. Under the "interstitial" analyses of the Tax
Court and the Service, the identical words of section 122 would be
understood to have different significance depending upon the par-
ticular circumstances to which they are applied. It can be logically
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argued that section 382 furnishes additional and different limitations
upon carryovers which survive Libson Shops, in the same way that
Libson Shops has been interpreted as coexisting with section 269. It
can be argued with the Ninth Circuit that the 1954 limitations are
intended to be comprehensive and, therefore, replace Libson Shops.
But there seems to be no logical room for the view that Libson Shops
retains vitality for some but not all carryovers. Since neither the
Tax Court nor the Service is prepared to press the notion that
Libson Shops retains its full place as a modifier of all carryovers
arising under section 172, it seems valid to conclude that the result
expressed in the Maxwell Hardware case will ultimately prevail.
But it should not be expected that the last has been heard from
Libson Shops. In Clarksdale Rubber the Tax Court firmly rejected
the Ninth Circuit's burial of Libson Shops; instead it adheres to
Judge Scott's "interstitial" view. And TIR 773 holds that Libson
Shops applied in instances not specifically contemplated by sections
381 and 382. Government litigators, when it comes to the actual
argument and briefing of cases can be expected to deploy all au-
thorities, including section 269, Libson Shops and whatever else is
available, notwithstanding the more generous concessions in the pub-
lished rulings, so there will be no lack of opportunities for courts in
circuits other than the Ninth to reconsider the position. Moreover,
the Tax Court's "interstitial" view is likely to create some more of
the fog and disorder which the 1954 legislation was intended to
dispel. If the ingenuities which produced the Maxwell Hardware
transaction are multiplied and a certain degree of confusion is main-
tained, it would not be surprising if Congress could be persuaded to
look again at the loss carryover problem. In that case it might well
consider replacing the disparate and often inconsistent policies of
sections 269, 381 and 382 with a unified concept which comprehends
the whole spectrum of factual combinations. Libson Shops may well
be the source of that concept.
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